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This paper examines the status of naturalism in the philosophies of 
Edmund Husserl and John Dewey. Despite the many points of 
overlap and agreement between Husserl’s and Dewey’s 
philosophical projects, there remains one glaring difference, 
namely, the place and status of naturalism in their approaches. 
For Husserl, naturalism is an enemy to be vanquished. For Dewey, 
naturalism is the only method that can put philosophy back in 
touch with the concerns of human beings. This paper will 
demonstrate the remarkable similarities between Husserl’s and 
Dewey’s thought before contending that Dewey’s “naturalistic 
humanism” offers a conception of naturalism which is compatible 
with Husserlian phenomenology. Furthermore, reading these two 
philosophers together, this paper argues, can point the way 
forward to a naturalism which avoids the dismissal of the 
contributions made by knowing subjects carried out by dominant 
contemporary strains of reductive naturalism.  
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n The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology — the last work published before his death 
and the last in a seemingly endless series of “introductions” 
to phenomenology — Edmund Husserl calls into question 
the implicit presuppositions on which the sciences, including 
philosophy, stand. These presuppositions, he argues, are carried 
over from the subjective perspective from which scientific inquiry 
is necessarily conducted. In the lecture which opens the Crisis, 
Husserl points out to his audience that despite the great success of 
the sciences, a crisis has nevertheless arisen precisely because 
human experience has been forgotten as the ground of scientific 
investigation. Because of this, Husserl contends, we are no longer 
asking the right questions.  He writes, “The exclusiveness with 
which the total world-view of modern man, in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, let itself be determined by the positive 
sciences and be blinded by the ‘prosperity’ they produced, meant 
an indifferent turning-away from the questions which are decisive 
for a genuine humanity…questions of the meaning or 
meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence” (Husserl 
1970, 5-6).  
While Husserl focuses on an emergent crisis of the sciences, 
John Dewey emphasizes a crisis that has arisen within philosophy 
itself.1 Lamenting the vestiges of antiquated idealist and 
supernaturalist philosophies which maintain a stronghold in 
contemporary philosophy, Dewey argues that the positing of non-
empirical phenomena, that is, anything which can be said to exist 
outside the bounds of the natural world, leads to a neglect of the 
very serious problems that must be dealt with here and now. In 
other words, we have forgotten the questions which matter to us 
most in our everyday experience. Thus, Dewey, like Husserl, 
passionately argues for a return to human experience. But unlike 
Husserl, Dewey explicitly advocates for a naturalistic approach. 
For Dewey, this is the only method up to the task, the only one that 
can lead us back to what he calls “primary experience.” But for 
Husserl, naturalism is precisely the method that presents the 
greatest obstacle to a return to experience. Given their common 
I 
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goal of retrieving the experiential ground of scientific and 
philosophic investigations, how could they have arrived at such 
different views about the method by which this task is to be carried 
out?  
In what follows, I try to answer this question by arguing that 
Dewey’s particular brand of naturalism, what he calls “naturalistic 
humanism,” shares more in common with phenomenology than it 
does with contemporary versions of reductive naturalism. I think 
that when read together, the philosophical projects of Husserl and 
Dewey offer a form of naturalism that can serve as a powerful 
alternative to dominant contemporary strains of reductionism. The 
aim of the present paper will not be to suggest that Dewey is 
himself a phenomenologist or, conversely, that Husserl is a 
pragmatist. As Victor Kestenbaum warns of such an approach, 
“Too much of Dewey’s meaning has been overlooked or 
misinterpreted as a result of the ascription of one label after 
another to his philosophy. Certainly, to burden Dewey’s 
philosophy with one more label cannot possibly serve any 
reasonable end” (Kestenbaum 1977, 5). While Husserl has been 
subject to much less obscuring interpretations, I do not want to risk 
concealing the importance of either of their respective projects. 
Rather, the idea is to look at the best insights of both philosophers 
regarding human modes of knowing and interacting with the world 
in an effort to get closer to a form of naturalism that does not 
require that we give up on the contributions to experience made by 
experiencing subjects. In this sense, the “toward” in my title should 
be taken seriously. This project presents a way forward for 
thinking of naturalism along these lines while leaving open for 
further development the precise path such an approach should take.  
 
HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF 
NATURALISM 
Naturalism is an ambiguous term, to say the least, and this 
despite the fact that, by most accounts, it is the dominant 
contemporary philosophical paradigm. In its broadest construal, 
naturalism simply holds that we should include in our ontology 
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only entities which exist in the natural world. However, as Barry 
Stroud points out, the controversy over naturalism is not about 
whether one ought to be a naturalist but rather over “what is and 
what is not to be included in one’s conception of ‘nature’” (Stroud 
2004, 22). Importantly, one’s method of investigating the natural 
world will depend on what one takes to be included in one’s 
conception of nature. Thus, we can distinguish between ontological 
and methodological aspects of naturalism. The ontological aspect 
provides an account of what there is, of what kinds of objects are 
included in nature, and the methodological aspect provides an 
account of how those objects should be studied.2 
Husserl seeks to thwart naturalism as a methodological 
approach, specifically as applied to the study of human 
subjectivity. However, for Husserl, methodological naturalism is 
not sharply separated from certain naturalistic ontological claims, 
particularly of the physicalist variety. As Dermot Moran points 
out, Husserl associated naturalism “with a parallel commitment to 
physicalism and, in his day, sense-data positivism” (Moran 2013, 
92). For him, consciousness is not some object which can be 
isolated and empirically studied. Many strains of naturalism 
suggest this approach. Certain forms of physicalism, for instance, 
would make of the mind something which can be studied as 
nothing more than brain states. As long as we have the appropriate 
tools to examine the structure of the brain, we will be able to learn 
everything there is to know about the mind, too. As Stroud 
summarizes this approach, “physicalism says that the natural world 
is exhausted by all the physical facts. That is all and only what the 
natural world amounts to on this view; there is nothing else in 
nature…It not only states all the physical facts, which presumably 
can be determined by broadly naturalistic means, but it goes on to 
say that those are all the facts there are—that they are the whole 
truth about the world” (Stroud 2014, 27). On this view, everything 
can, in principle, be studied in an empirical fashion; every object, 
including human consciousness, can be an object for empirical 
science. In other words, the same methodological approach 
deployed when studying the brain, for instance, can be deployed 
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vis-à-vis the nature of subjectivity itself. If we accept the point that 
all there is are physical facts, then subjectivity is rendered just one 
among many physical objects that can be studied by strictly 
empirical means. For Husserl, however, we lose something crucial 
if we approach the study of subjectivity in this way.  
It is important to note that Husserl does not question the 
tremendous importance of empirical science. The empirical 
sciences have achieved significant successes and have contributed 
in countless ways to our understanding of ourselves and our world. 
But he warns that it is precisely the great success of the empirical 
sciences that has engendered a kind of blind faith in their ability to 
uncover everything about the world, including how it is that we 
humans experience the world in the ways that we do. Problems 
arise when the positive sciences extend their reach into the domain 
of human experience, attempting to explain human subjectivity as 
if it were merely one object among other objects. We can detect 
the continued deployment of this line of thinking in the 
contemporary drive to discover the neurobiological correlates of 
consciousness, for instance. For Husserl, however, consciousness 
is not a mere object. Rather, it is the condition for the possibility of 
experiencing objects, of having any experience at all. Naturalism,  
conceived as a methodological approach to the study of human 
subjectivity, is the problem threatening a proper understanding of 
ourselves: thus, a formidable foe that must be vanquished. To see 
why Husserl thinks this way, let us look more closely at his project 
in the Crisis, one of his most sustained engagements with the 
problems posed by naturalism.  
History occupies a central place in the Crisis, a place it does 
not, for the most part, occupy in any of Husserl’s other works. He 
is concerned with how it is that the world means something to us. 
More specifically, Husserl is concerned to uncover the way in 
which worldly meaning has been constituted. I mean here the way 
in which, for instance, language, art, and other cultural objects can 
be immediately apprehended as meaningful. His answer to this 
question involves the way in which the plurality of conscious 
subjects in the world intertwine in order to achieve an 
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understanding of meanings which are co-constituted, co-
experienced, and intersubjectively verifiable. The way in which 
Husserl goes about uncovering this constitution of meaning 
involves a unique historical operation, a kind of genealogy which 
directs questions not into the factual or empirical state of affairs of 
a particular historical moment, but rather into the conditions for the 
possibility of the meanings we find readymade in the world today. 
Through this genealogical procedure, tradition is revealed to be the 
vehicle of worldly meaning, the way in which meaning is handed 
down through generations, appropriated, and furthered.  
To make this a bit clearer, consider geometry, a science that 
serves as an example throughout the Crisis of this form of meaning 
constitution and to which Husserl devoted a short essay (published 
as an appendix to the Crisis) entitled, “The Origin of Geometry.”3 
The formal science of geometry originated with Euclid and was 
further developed into something more like the geometry we know 
today by Galileo. But when we undertake a geometrical problem, 
we need not approach the world in the way that Euclid or Galileo 
did, that is, without a developed science of geometry. We do not 
need to achieve the original insight of Euclid in order to solve a 
geometrical problem. Rather, we can plug in certain theorems, say, 
the Pythagorean Theorem, and thereby solve our problem without 
achieving the genuine insight of the first geometers. And the 
reason that we can do this is because geometry is a science which 
has been handed down in the form of a tradition ever since its 
inception in the mind of Euclid. Geometry has been appropriated 
and built upon by subsequent geometers with the discovery of ever 
new applications and theorems. There is an entire history of 
thought and practice which is bound up with every application of 
the Pythagorean Theorem.  
How is this genealogy supposed to achieve the radical 
reorientation of scientific inquiry for which Husserl is advocating? 
The idea here is to exhibit the science of geometry, and science in 
general, as precisely a human accomplishment rather than a form 
of inquiry that reveals pure, objective truths about the world. 
Geometry, he shows, had to be constituted by a particular 
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consciousness with a particular point of view on the world. What 
gets lost in our unquestioning application of scientific 
methodologies is that someone had to develop those procedures 
and methods. Methods of geometrical measurement, for example, 
were developed in response to a certain practical need, the need to 
build sturdier structures, for example (in this regard, there appears 
to be a definite pragmatic current running through Husserlian 
phenomenology). When we forget this aspect of science, when we 
forget that scientific methods are developed out of human thought 
and practice, we begin to think of them as rendering truths about 
the world unadulterated by subjective presuppositions and 
attitudes.  
As Dermot Moran points out, “The peculiar manner in which 
the world and objects in the world appear to consciousness, their 
‘phenomenality,’ is not simply an objective fact in the world but 
rather an accomplishment of an interwoven web of subjectivities 
that in this sense transcend the world and are presupposed by the 
sciences that study the world” (Moran 2013, 90). In the naturalistic 
practice of science, by contrast, the world is taken for granted as 
really existing and as being a certain way apart from its being 
perceived by a subject. But as Moran points out, “[n]aturalism 
betrays the very essence of science. It misunderstands the world 
because it misunderstands the subject’s necessary role in the 
project of knowledge. One cannot subtract the knowing subject 
from the process of knowledge, and treat the desiccated product as 
if it were the real world” (ibid., 92-3). If this is our approach to the 
world, then we will always miss a crucial aspect of it — arguably 
the most important aspect, namely, our contribution as knowing 
subjects to the constitution of meaning which is rooted in our 
subjective and intersubjective perspective.  
For Husserl, every consciousness must take a point of view on 
the world. Thus, even the purportedly objective perspective taken 
by science is necessarily rooted in the subjective perspectives of 
the scientists engaged in inquiry. What Moran calls naturalistic 
objectivism “takes a stance that does not know it is a stance” (ibid., 
105). The “subjective-relative” domain of the life-world 
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“constantly functions as a subsoil” in all our dealings with the 
world (Husserl 1970, 124). Recognition of this fact is crucial for 
the development of the sciences and philosophy. In this way, 
Husserl argues that a reductionist form of naturalism cannot fully 
explain our relation to the world insofar as it ignores and leaves 
unquestioned its own condition of possibility, namely, conscious, 
subjective experience. 
 
DEWEY’S NATURALISTIC HUMANISM AND ITS 
RELATION TO PHENOMENOLOGY 
On a first approach, it seems that Dewey’s thought apropos 
naturalism couldn’t be further from Husserl’s. Indeed, the opening 
lines of Dewey’s Experience and Nature explicitly identify 
naturalism as his preferred method: “The title of this volume, 
Experience and Nature, is intended to signify that the philosophy 
here presented may be termed either empirical naturalism or 
naturalistic empiricism, or taking ‘experience’ in its usual 
signification, naturalistic humanism” (Dewey 1958, 1). But we are 
already in uncharted waters with Dewey’s melding of the concepts 
of ‘experience’ and ‘nature’ in his title and ‘humanism’ and 
‘naturalism’ in his text — relationships which are typically not 
evoked in discussions of naturalism. The lines immediately 
following the above passage evince an affinity between Husserl’s 
and Dewey’s respective philosophical projects: “To many the 
associating of the two words [experience and nature] will seem like 
talking of a round square, so engrained is the notion of the 
separation of man and experience from nature” (ibid.). Dewey here 
alludes to philosophies which maintain that human experience is so 
unique that it is cut off from nature and that nature is thoroughly 
subordinate to human experience. However, he is equally 
suspicious of philosophies which conceive of experience as a 
purely natural phenomenon in the sense that it is mechanistic and 
determined and thus gives way to a reduction of experience, 
against which we saw Husserl arguing above. Dewey continues, 
“According to an opposite school, experience fares as badly, nature 
being thought to signify something wholly material and 
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mechanistic; to frame a theory of experience in naturalistic terms 
is, accordingly, to degrade and deny the noble and ideal values that 
characterize experience” (ibid.). Contrary to these views which 
oppose experience to nature, Dewey seeks to articulate a form of 
naturalism according to which experience and nature are 
irreducible yet inextricably intertwined. This basic position, which 
seems to guide much of Dewey’s thought, suggests a strong but 
complex bond between his own naturalism and Husserl’s 
phenomenology.  
Dewey’s primary concern is to develop a philosophy capable 
of offering solutions to real problems encountered in ordinary or 
“primary” experience. He spills much ink arguing against 
philosophical predecessors whom he credits with creating a chasm 
between philosophy and the concerns of everyday life. Philosophy, 
Dewey thinks, has been led astray by various idealisms and 
supernaturalisms: “Not tested by being employed to see what it 
leads to in ordinary experience and what new meanings it 
contributes, this subject-matter becomes arbitrary, aloof...” (Dewey 
1958, 6). Philosophy’s neglect of experience is that “which 
accounts for the revulsion of many cultivated persons from any 
form of philosophy” (ibid.). Philosophy must reorient itself vis-à-
vis the concerns of ordinary life if it is to have any relevance for 
the aims of humanity. Dewey shares this conviction with Husserl, 
who remarks, “In our philosophizing, then — how can we avoid 
it? — we are functionaries of mankind” (Husserl 1970, 17). But 
unlike Husserl’s attempt to return science and philosophy to the 
concerns of ordinary experience, Dewey’s passes directly through 
naturalism.  
Dewey’s enthusiasm for Darwinian evolutionary theory has 
much to do with his desire to put the concerns of philosophy back 
in touch with the concerns of quotidian experience. The 
publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species generated a 
radical shift in our conception of nature. The account developed in 
that work overturned centuries of established belief that a 
“species” designated stable and unchanging traits of a group of 
organisms. Applied to nature more broadly, these older ideas held 
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that nature is a kind of teleological development, that nature is 
engaged in an unwavering progression toward a single, ultimate 
end. However, given the apparent flux and instability of nature, 
“there are but two alternative courses” if we are to explain nature 
as it is in itself (Dewey 1997, 6). As Dewey notes, “We must either 
find the appropriate objects and organs of knowledge in the mutual 
interactions of changing things; or else, to escape the infection of 
change, we must seek them in some transcendent and supernal 
region” (ibid., 6-7). Unfortunately, a glance through the history of 
philosophical thought suggests that the latter is the preferred 
option.   
According to Dewey, Darwin offers us a way out. He writes 
approvingly, “Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary 
thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, 
new intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific 
revolution that found its climax in the ‘Origin of Species’” (ibid., 
19). By showing that “all organic adaptations are due simply to 
constant variation and the elimination of those variations which are 
harmful in the struggle for existence,” Darwin ended the search for 
a transcendent guiding principle to be applied to the natural world. 
He showed that rather than owing its development to a divine 
creator or teleological organization, nature generates itself out of 
itself. The changes that we observe in the natural world are due to 
nothing else than the interaction of natural organisms with other 
natural organisms. Dewey thus credits Darwin with taking our 
heads out of the clouds, so to speak, and returning them to the 
world we see before us.  
The return to primary experience initiated by the Darwinian 
revolution raises a question about the status of the knowing 
subject. What precisely is the relation between the subject and its 
object, that is, the natural world? Dewey’s answer to this question 
reveals the unique character of his brand of naturalism and his 
profound disagreement with philosophies that separate subject 
from object, experience from nature. Here, Dewey articulates the 
visions of nature to which he is opposed:  
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Experience, they say, is important for those beings 
who have it, but is too casual and sporadic in its 
occurrence to carry with it any important 
implications regarding the nature of Nature. Nature, 
on the other hand, is said to be complete apart from 
experience. Indeed, according to some thinkers the 
case is even in worse plight: Experience to them is 
not only something extraneous which is 
occasionally superimposed upon nature, but it forms 
a veil or screen which shuts us off from nature, 
unless in some way it can be ‘transcended.’ So 
something non-natural by way of reason or intuition 
is introduced, something supra-empirical. According 
to an opposite school experience fares as badly, 
nature being thought to signify something wholly 
material and mechanistic; to frame a theory of 
experience in naturalistic terms is, accordingly, to 
degrade and deny the noble and ideal values that 
characterize experience. (Dewey 1958, 1) 
 
On the former view, experience is a non-natural object and is 
therefore cut off from nature. On the latter view, naturalizing 
experience amounts to reducing it to a mechanical and determined 
operation and requires that we ignore the richness and complexity 
of experience. In both cases, experience is opposed to nature. 
Dewey’s project, then, is to relocate experience within nature 
without thereby reducing it to merely material processes.  
The idea of an intimate correlation between experience and 
nature is integral to Dewey’s thought. In the 1929 Gifford 
Lectures, published as The Quest for Certainty, he can be seen 
elaborating further upon the points made four years earlier in the 
Carus lectures that comprised Experience and Nature. Dewey 
notes that “all of the rivalries and connected problems” of 
epistemology “grow from a single root,” namely, “the assumption 
that the true and valid object of knowledge is that which has being 
prior to and independent of the operation of knowing. They spring 
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from the doctrine that knowledge is a grasp or beholding of reality 
without anything being done to modify its antecedent state—the 
doctrine which is the source of the separation of knowledge from 
practical activity” (Dewey 1929, 196). For him, the object of 
knowledge only exists as such insofar as it is part of an operation 
of knowledge, insofar as it is an object of experience. Or, to put it 
in Husserlian parlance, the phenomenon has being only insofar as 
it appears. Dewey goes on to remark, “If we see that knowing is 
not the act of an outside spectator but of a participator inside the 
natural and social scene, then the true object of knowledge resides 
in the consequences of directed action” (ibid., 196). In other words, 
the world is disclosed precisely through the conscious activity of a 
knowing, thinking subject. There is a reciprocal relation between 
experience and nature. As he puts it, “[E]xperience presents itself 
as the method, and the only method, for getting at nature, 
penetrating its secrets, and wherein nature empirically disclosed 
deepens, enriches and directs the further development of 
experience” (Dewey 1958, 2). 
We can now begin to trace some significant connections 
between Husserl and Dewey. The affirmation of a correlation 
between subject and object constitutes perhaps the strongest link 
between them. For both philosophers, subject cannot be 
fundamentally separated from object. Rather, the two are 
inextricably related. Neither pole exists in isolation from the other. 
This fundamental agreement, I think, is precisely what accounts for 
the significant overlap in their philosophical programs. Indeed, it 
seems to be the very motor that drives their thought. The operative 
principle in phenomenology is that consciousness is always 
consciousness of something and objects are always objects for 
consciousness. This principle expresses the phenomenological 
concept of intentionality, and it also reflects a Deweyan sentiment, 
namely, that the knowing subject is immersed in the world and is 
always in an intentional or experiential relation with it. It is on the 
basis of the discovery of this correlation that Husserl proclaims 
that we are simultaneously “objects . . . in the . . . world” and 
“subjects for the world” (Husserl 1970, 104-05). Dewey directly 
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echoes this claim when he remarks that “experience is of as well as 
in nature” (Dewey 1958, 4). This principle thus reflects both 
Husserl’s and Dewey’s fundamental conviction that the essence of 
both philosophy and science is constituted within the domain of 
experience.  
This crucial idea, I claim, accounts for many of Husserl’s and 
Dewey’s shared conclusions, the most significant of which is that 
every conscious, experiencing subject experiences the same world 
as everyone else. There are, of course, different attitudes and 
perspectives one can take on the world, but the context of each 
attitude is that one’s consciousness is correlated to the very same 
world of experience. This idea, I think, is the key to understanding 
both Husserl’s and Dewey’s thought.4 It is on the basis of this 
notion that Husserl’s genealogical inquiry discussed above is made 
possible. His historical inquiry into the origins of geometry is 
possible only insofar as the experience or consciousness of Galileo 
can be said to have been grounded in the very same world (though, 
of course, at a different stage of development) in which we are 
currently immersed. We can inquire into the original 
accomplishment of the first geometers because their science was 
developed from the ground of the world in which we find 
ourselves. We can rest on the original accomplishment of geometry 
precisely because that accomplishment constitutes a layer in the 
theoretical and practical development of our understanding of the 
world.  
If there is a universal correlation between subject and object, if 
the geometer inhabits the same world as the mechanic, then it is 
equally true that the scientist, the philosopher, and the layman all 
share the same world of experience. This claim forms the crux of 
both Husserl’s and Dewey’s entire projects. Accepting this point is 
crucial for putting the claims of science and philosophy back in 
touch with the world of everyday experience. Dewey captures this 
idea perfectly when he notes that “experienced material is the same 
for the scientific man and the man in the street. The latter cannot 
follow the intervening reasoning without special preparation. But 
stars, rocks, trees, and creeping things are the same material of 
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experience for both” (Dewey 1958, 2). This is precisely the point 
of Husserl’s entire project in the Crisis, namely, to show that 
science is a human accomplishment developed out of the pre-
scientific ground of the life-world of everyday experience. Only 
when we realize this will our scientific and philosophical projects 
reach their true potential, only then will science and philosophy 
“render our ordinary life-experiences . . . more significant, more 
luminous . . . and make our dealings with them more fruitful” 
(ibid., 7). Putting our theoretical inquiries back in touch with 
experience allows us to once again ask the proper questions, 
“questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this 
human existence” (Husserl 1970, 6). 
 
CONCLUSION: HUSSERL, DEWEY, AND THE FATE OF 
NATURALISM 
At this point, the remarkable degree of agreement between 
Husserl’s and Dewey’s philosophical projects should be clear. But 
what are we to make of the status of naturalism in view of 
Dewey’s reappraisal of what naturalism can and should be? The 
basic point behind Dewey’s particular brand of naturalism is that 
we should not conceive of ourselves as beings cut off from nature. 
On the one hand, various forms of idealism and supernaturalism 
have long maintained that human thought and experience exist 
over and above the natural world. The latter is thus rendered 
unimportant. On the other hand, reductive forms of naturalism 
have led to a similar cleavage between the natural world and 
human experience, with experience then becoming the victim of 
purported insignificance. Both of these opposed poles leave no 
room for reconciliation between experience and nature. But as 
Dewey shows, the natural world is precisely where the social, 
political, and theoretical problems that are most pressing originate. 
A proper response to these questions demands a philosophical 
reintegration of experience and nature.  
The attempt to bring philosophical concerns back within the 
frame of experience is a project in which, as we have seen, Husserl 
is engaged as well. However, his philosophy is often seen as 
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hostile to naturalism in whatever form it may take.  This apparent 
hostility strengthens charges of idealism following Husserl’s 
“transcendental turn.” However, Dewey offers a naturalistic 
framework which does not require that we give up the idea that 
experience is a crucial piece of the meaning-making process. 
Indeed, in a Deweyan naturalistic framework, there is no meaning 
to be generated without the interaction of the knowing subject and 
objects of experience. Taking the insight from phenomenology that 
consciousness is always consciousness of some object and merging 
it with Dewey’s insight that maintaining this position does not 
require that we ascribe some extra- or super-natural status to the 
mind allows us to be naturalists without thereby dismissing the 
necessary and inextricable contributions of the meaning-making 
subject. Husserl and Dewey both recognize the importance of the 
experiencing subject in the process of knowledge, and both 
recognize that attempts to isolate subjectivity from its position 
within experience are misguided. By integrating a Deweyan-style 
naturalistic humanism into this basic position, we can bolster this 
claim and, at the same time, take seriously the findings of the 
natural sciences and what they reveal about what kinds of creatures 
we are.  
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NOTES 
1. To be sure, Husserl also acknowledges a crisis within 
philosophy. Indeed, he cites the failures of philosophy as the reason for 
the crisis of the positive sciences: “Thus, the crisis of philosophy implies 
the crisis of all modern sciences as members of the philosophical 
universe: at first a latent, then a more and more prominent crisis of 
European humanity itself in respect to the total meaningfulness of its 
cultural life, its total ‘Existenz’” (Husserl 1970, 5-6). 
2. As Robert Pennock has argued, methodological naturalism need 
not make any ontological commitments. Methodological naturalism 
states only that, for the purposes of scientific inquiry, non-natural entities 
do not exist. In this sense, naturalism is a methodological assumption 
rather than an ontological claim, a heuristic device for problem-solving 
which guides scientific inquiry (Pennock, 1999). 
3. “The Origin of Geometry” is an excellent distillation of many of 
the themes in the Crisis. It is used frequently to talk about what Husserl 
is up to in the Crisis because it is such a concise example of his entire 
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project in that work. Husserl says of his localized reflections on 
geometry what can be said about his entire argument throughout the 
Crisis: “Our considerations will necessarily lead to the deepest problems 
of meaning, problems of science and of the history of science in general, 
and indeed in the end to problems of a universal history in general” 
(Husserl 1970, 353). This short essay has been tremendously influential. 
Indeed, Jacques Derrida’s first major published work was a long, critical 
introduction to “The Origin of Geometry” and can be read as a kind of 
“jumping off” point for Derrida’s later work on writing and speech. 
4. In a footnote within the Crisis, Husserl confesses that this insight 
about the a priori correlation between subject and object, consciousness 
and world is the one which guides all of his work: “The first 
breakthrough of this universal a priori of correlation between 
experienced object and manners of givenness…affected me so deeply 
that my whole subsequent life-work has been dominated by the task of 
systematically elaborating on this a priori of correlation” (Husserl 1970, 
166). 
 
